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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimuli for Working Parents* 
 
To promote the labor participation of parents with young children, governments employ a 
number of fiscal instruments. Prominent examples are childcare subsidies and in-work 
benefits. However, which policy works best for employment is largely unknown. We study the 
effectiveness of different fiscal stimuli in an empirical model of household labor supply and 
childcare use. We use a large and rich administrative data set for the Netherlands. Large-
scale reforms in childcare subsidies and in-work benefits in the data period facilitate the 
identification of the structural parameters. We find that an in-work benefit for secondary 
earners that increases with income is the most effective way to stimulate total hours worked. 
Childcare subsidies are less effective, as substitution of other types of care for formal care 
drives up public expenditures. In-work benefits that target both primary and secondary 
earners are much less effective, because primary earners are rather unresponsive to 
financial incentives. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we compare the effectiveness of different fiscal policies targeted at working
families with children which aim to promote parental labor participation. There are large
differences in the mix of fiscal support for these families across countries. For example,
Scandinavian countries direct much of their public support for working parents to childcare
subsidies (OECD, 2014; Kleven, 2014), whereas the US and Canada rely more on in-work
benefits to support this group (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). Although these policies
in part differ in their objectives, e.g. promoting skill formation among disadvantaged
children versus income support for disadvantaged families, a common goal is that they aim
to stimulate employment. There is a large body of literature studying the employment
effects of childcare subsidies (and related programs like pre-kindergarten and pre-school)1
and there is large body of literature studying the employment effects of in-work benefits for
families with children.2 However, we know very little on the relative effectiveness of these
policies in terms of additional employment per additional dollar or euro spent, and hence
the policy mix that works best for employment. Furthermore, there are large differences
across countries when it comes to the targeting of these policies. For example, in-work
benefits for families in the US and the UK are primarily targeted at low incomes (Brewer
et al., 2009), whereas in-work benefits for families in the Netherlands are targeted more at
middle and high incomes (see below). Targeting childcare subsidies and in-work benefits
at working parents with low incomes may cause a loss in efficiency. This, however, depends
on the relative importance of labor supply responses on the extensive (participation) and
intensive (hours worked per employed) margin (Saez, 2002). Also here, we know very little
on the efficiency loss (if any) of targeting income support more at working parents with
low incomes rather than middle and high incomes.
We offer a systematic analysis of the effectiveness of childcare subsidies and in-work
benefits for families with children in terms of stimulation of parental labor supply. Specif-
ically, we consider how these policies compare to each other in terms of additional public
spending required per additional (fulltime equivalent) employed, where we show that it is
crucial to take into account the effects of behavioral responses on the government budget.
Furthermore, we consider to what extent targeting these fiscal policies at different income
1See Blau (2003) for an overview, and Lokshin (2004), Tekin (2007), Baker et al. (2008), Cascio (2009),
Havnes and Mogstad (2011), and Fitzpatrick (2012) for some recent analyses.
2Two major in-work benefit programs that have received much attention in the literature are the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US and the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK.
See Meyer (2010) and Brewer and Browne (2006) and the references therein for empirical studies on the
impact of the EITC and WFTC on employment, respectively.
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groups affects their effectiveness, which highlights the equity-efficiency trade-off for these
policies.
To study the effectiveness of fiscal policies targeted at working parents we develop
and estimate a static structural model of parental labor supply and childcare use in the
Netherlands. We use a large and rich administrative household data set3 for the period
2006–2009 to estimate the preferences of couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age
(pre-primary school age) and couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of age (primary
school age). Specifically, we estimate the preferences using a discrete choice model for
the simultaneous choice of labor supply by the mother and the father, and the use of
childcare.4 An advantage of the discrete choice approach is that it does not require convex
or piece wise linear budget sets, so that we can take all the complexities of the tax-
benefit system into account (Van Soest et al., 2002). Furthermore, quasi-concavity of
preferences need not be imposed ex ante, and therefore coherency of the model does not
implicitly limit the range of behavioral responses that can be obtained (MaCurdy et al.,
1990). We model unobserved heterogeneity using the latent classes approach as outlined
in Train (2008) and Pacifico (2009), and recently applied to a model with maternal labor
supply and childcare choices by Apps et al. (2012). Latent classes are a flexible way of
modelling unobserved heterogeneity, which can prove important for inference of the model
(Pacifico, 2009). The identification of the structural parameters benefits from a large
reform in childcare subsidies and in-work benefits for working parents in the sample period,
which generates large exogenous variation in the budget sets. Hence, we go beyond an
identification based solely on cross-sectional variation, which may in part be endogenous,
resulting in poor identification of the structural parameters and a wide range of potential
biases (Blau, 2003). The reform also allows us to do a ‘reality check’ (Blundell, 2012) on
the behavioral responses of the structural model, by comparing the simulated responses
of the reform with the findings of a differences-in-differences analysis on the same reform
but using a different data set (Bettendorf et al., 2015).5
3The Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel in Dutch) of Statistics Netherlands (2012).
4Building on the work by e.g. Van Soest (1995), discrete choice models have become a popular tool
for the structural modelling of labor supply, see e.g. Keane and Moffitt (1998), Blundell et al. (2000),
Gong and Van Soest (2002), Blundell and Shephard (2012) and Bargain et al. (2014). For an overview
of discrete choice models that explicitly include childcare see Blau (2003). Recent applications include
Lokshin (2004), Kornstad and Thoresen (2006, 2007), Tekin (2007), Blundell and Shephard (2012), Gong
and Breunig (2012) and Apps et al. (2012).
5Our approach satisfies all the requirements set out by Meghir and Phillips (2010, p. 227) ”[E]stimating
incentive effects in a convincing way thus requires us to find solutions to all these problems at the same
time. This calls for a sufficiently flexible approach, that allows for fixed costs of work, does not impose
theory a priori everywhere in the sample (thus in a sense increasing model flexibility), uses exogenous
3
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the structural model with la-
tent classes predicts labor supply responses for fiscal reforms over the period 2005–2009
very much in line with the results from the difference-in-differences analysis. When we do
not allow for latent classes, the structural model predicts behavioral responses that are
too small. Second, we find that the most effective fiscal stimulus for working parents is
an in-work benefit targeted at secondary earners that rises with income. This provides
incentives both on the extensive (participation) and the intensive (hours per week) mar-
gin to a group of workers that is relatively responsive on both margins. Third, we find
that childcare subsidies are less effective than in-work benefits for secondary earners, as
substitution of other types of care for formal care drives up public expenditures, though
childcare subsidies are still much more effective than in-work benefits that target both pri-
mary and secondary earners, because primary earners are rather unresponsive to financial
incentives. Finally, we find that the effect of childcare subsidies on total hours worked is
not much lower when targeted more at low incomes than when targeted at middle and
high incomes. However, the knock-on effects, changes in public expenditures and receipts
due to behavioral changes, are more favorable when childcare subsidies are targeted more
at middle and high incomes, making childcare subsidies more effective per euro spent when
targeted more at middle and high incomes.
The paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. We have a large pol-
icy reform in our data period. This arguably leads to more credible exogenous variation
in budget sets than previous structural analyses of labor supply and childcare use that
relied mostly on cross-sectional variation. Furthermore, the policy reform also allows for
a quasi-experimental check on the behavioral responses of the structural model, and we
contribute to a small but growing literature that evaluates the performance of structural
models by comparing simulated policy responses with the results from quasi-experimental
studies (Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Geyer et al., 2014; Hansen and Liu, 2015). Also, with
the structural model, we can study a number of issues that we could not study in the
quasi-experimental analysis (as in Bettendorf et al., 2015). We can decompose the labor
participation effect of the 2005–2009 reform package into the effect of changes in childcare
subsidies and the effect of changes in in-work benefits.6 Furthermore, because our struc-
tural model is fully integrated with a detailed tax-benefit calculator, we are also able to
study the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli for working parents in terms of additional employ-
changes to work incentives to identify their effect, and allows for taxes and benefits. This is of course a
large set of requirements, but all have been shown to be important empirically; in our review of empirical
results we will use these criteria to judge the value of the estimates.”
6The structural model also allows us to predict the labor participation effects of a recent cut in childcare
subsidies in the Netherlands, see appendix F.
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ment generated per additional public euro spent. The integrated model allows us to go
beyond back-of-the-envelope calculations on the effectiveness of different types of family
policies (Blau, 2003; Lokshin, 2004). Although we focus on the impact of policy reforms in
the Netherlands, we argue that our findings are also relevant for the effectiveness of these
policies in other developed OECD countries. Indeed, the participation rate of mothers
and fathers in the Netherlands, as well as public spending on formal childcare and pre-
primary education, takes an intermediate position between Scandinavia and Anglo-Saxon
countries. Finally, our data set is exceptionally large and rich. Hence, we can identify
preferences for a large number of subgroups, including couples with a youngest child that
is in primary school. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to estimate a struc-
tural model for labor supply and out-of-school care, next to a model for labor supply and
daycare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the labor market and policy
environment in the Netherlands. Section 3 develops the structural model and outlines
the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the estimation
results and the corresponding labor supply and childcare elasticities. In this section we
also present a comparison of the simulated employment effects of the structural model for
the 2005–2009 reform package with the estimated employment effects of the differences-
in-differences study. In Section 6 we use the structural model to compare the effectiveness
of different fiscal stimuli for working parents. Section 7 concludes. An appendix contains
supplementary material.
2 Labor market and policy environment
In the mid 1970s, the participation rate of women (15–64 years of age) in the Nether-
lands was rather low by international standards, close to 30% (OECD, 2013).7 However,
following the economic crisis in the early 1980s, the participation rate of women in the
Netherlands started to rise. The rise in participation by mothers of young children was
particularly strong (Euwals et al., 2011). By 2004, the Netherlands, with a participation
rate of women close to 70%, took an intermediate position between the somewhat higher
participation rates in e.g. Norway and Sweden, and the somewhat lower participation
rates in e.g. the US and the UK.8
7This section draws heavily on Bettendorf et al. (2015).
8Whereas the participation rate of women in the Netherlands has converged to other well-developed
OECD countries, there remains a sizeable and stable gap in hours worked by employed women (OECD,
2013). In 2004, employed women in the Netherlands worked on average approximately 24 hours per week,
while their counterparts in other OECD countries worked 5 to 10 hours per week more. Indeed, in 2004,
5
The participation rate of men in the Netherlands dropped from the mid 1970s to
the mid 1980s. In the face of adverse labor market conditions, many men were sent
into early retirement and disability. However, in the 1990s and 2000s the generosity of
early retirement and disability was cut back, and participation rates returned to levels
comparable to other developed OECD countries.9
To further promote the labor participation (in persons but also in hours worked per
week) by families with children, and of mothers in particular, the Dutch government
implemented a series of reforms over the period 2005–2009. Following a brief introduction
into the pre-reform childcare market in the Netherlands, below we give a short historical
account of the policy changes over the period 2005–2009.
Children in the Netherlands go to primary school when they turn 4, and most children
are 12 years old when they go to secondary school. Before the age of 4, children can go to
centre-based daycare, so-called playgroups (peuterspeelzalen) and informal care. Before the
introduction of the Law on Childcare (Wet kinderopvang) in 2005, centre-based daycare
was subsidized at varying rates.10 The majority (76%) of places was subsidized directly by
employers and local governments.11 These places had lower effective parental fees than so-
called ‘unsubsidized’ places (24%), the costs of which were however partly tax deductible
for parents. To qualify for the subsidies and tax deduction, both parents for two-parent
households and one parent for single-parent households need to work. The enrollment rate
of children 0–3 years of age in centre-based care was 25% in 2004 (see Figure 1). Next
to centre-based care, a large number of children also go to playgroups. This is part-time
care for less than 4 hours per day, mostly used by families in which one of the parents
does not work. Playgroups are not a subsitute for centre-based care as they do not cover
enough hours of care for the parents to work. In 2004, the enrollment rate of children 0–3
in playgroups was also close to 25%.
Children that are in primary school (4–12 years of age) can go to centre-based out-of-
school care and informal care. Similar to daycare, before the introduction of the Law on
Childcare, subsidized and unsubsidized centre-based out-of-school care places co-existed,
where the costs of unsubsidized places were partly tax deductible for parents. The enroll-
the share of women working part-time in the Netherlands was 60%, by far the largest share in the OECD
(OECD, 2013).
9Hours worked per week by employed men (on average approximately 36 hours per week in 2004) are
also somewhat lower in the Netherlands than in other well-developed OECD countries, but the difference
is much less pronounced than for women (OECD, 2013).
10All the data on the use of formal childcare in this section are from Statistics Netherlands
(http://statline.cbs.nl).
11The subsidy is per hour of formal childcare.
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ment rate of 4–12 year olds in centre-based care was 6% in 2004.
The series of reforms started with the introduction of the Law on Childcare in 2005.
This law unified the subsidies for childcare places. From 2005 onwards, all formal places
qualified for the same subsidy from the central government. This increased the subsidy
somewhat for parents with children going to an unsubsidized place before 2005. Care by
childminders, at the home of the childminder or of the children, also became eligible for
subsidies under this law. But the unification of the subsidies and the extension to care by
childminders had only a minor effect on public spending on formal childcare. Indeed, the
subsidy was actually reduced somewhat for the highest incomes12, and public spending
actually fell slightly from 2004 to 2005, see Table 1.
More important were the changes that followed in 2006 and 2007. In these years the
subsidy rate was increased drastically, in particular in 2007. Figure 2 shows the changes
in the parental contribution rate for the ‘first child’.13 The parental fee depends on the
income of the household. In all years, households with the lowest income receive the
highest subsidy (up to 96% of the full price). For the lowest income households the
subsidy rate hardly changed. For the middle income households the subsidy rate went up
by 20 to 40%-points, whereas the increase in the subsidy for the highest income households
was somewhat smaller than for middle income households. On average, the parental cost
share in the full price dropped from 37% in 2005 to 18% in 2007.14,15 Next to the drop
in parental fees, from 2007 onwards schools were obliged to act as an intermediary for
parents and childcare institutions to arrange out-of-school care.
In 2008 there were virtually no changes in childcare subsidies. 2009 then witnessed a
partial reversal of the increase in childcare subsidies, as subsidies were cut back somewhat,
see again Figure 2.
Over the period 2005–2009, public spending on formal childcare went from 1 to 3 billion
euro. By 2009, with public spending on childcare and pre-primary education of 0.5% of
GDP, the Netherlands took an intermediate position between Sweden and Norway that
spent respectively 1.4 and 1.2% of GDP on these policies on the one hand, and the US and
Canada that spent 0.4 and 0.2% of GDP on these policies on the other (OECD, 2014).
12See Plantenga et al. (2005).
13The Tax Office defines the first child as the child for which the parents have the highest childcare
expenditures. For most households the first child is the youngest child since more hours are needed for
daycare than for out-of-school care.
14Source: Tax Office data provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (personal com-
munication).
15Despite the steep increase in the subsidy rate, the average prices of formal childcare places grew more
or less in line with the CPI.
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8Table 1: Public spending on childcare and in-work benefits for parents (millions of euro)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Childcare subsidies 725 755 1,028 1,001 1,343 2,058 2,825 3,034
In-work benefits for parents 410 460 738 830 871 984 971 1,290
– Combinatiekortinga 410 460 479 484 314 324 247 0
– Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekortingb 0 0 259 346 557 660 724 1,290
Source: Ministry of Finance (2010) and own calculations (imputation of employers’ contribution for childcare up to 2007 with
data from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (personal communication) and split of the in-work benefits for parents
in its two components using the MIMOSI model of CPB). aThe Combinatiekorting applies to primary earners, secondary earners
and working single parents with a youngest child up to 12 years of age. bThe Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting applies
to secondary earners and working single parents with a youngest child up to 12 years of age.
Figure 1: Share of children in formal childcare (in %)
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Source: Statistics Netherlands.
Figure 2: Parental contribution rate for the first child
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Source: Own calculations using publicly available subsidy tables.
Figure 1 shows the corresponding rise in the use of formal childcare over the period
2001–2009 in the Netherlands. Following the steep drop in the parental fee in 2006 and
2007, there was a steep rise in the use of formal childcare, both for children 0–3 years of
age (daycare) and for children 4–12 years of age (out-of-school care).
The period 2005–2009 also witnessed a number of changes in in-work benefits for
working parents. Figure 3 shows the level of the Combination Benefit (Combinatiekorting)
per year over this period. All working parents with a youngest child less than 12 years of
age qualify for this in-work benefit.16 Furthermore, the in-work benefit was independent
of the level of earned income, provided earned income was above a certain (low) threshold
(approximately 25% of the annual gross minimum wage). The Combination Benefit was
introduced in the major tax reform of 2001, but was phased out over the period 2005–
2009. There was a reduction in 2006, and then a smaller reduction in 2008 before it was
eventually abolished in 2009.
Figure 4 shows the level of the Income-Dependent Combination Benefit (Inkomen-
safhankelijke Combinatiekorting) per year by earned income over the period 2005–2009.17
16The name refers to the combination of work and care.
17Up to 2008 the Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting was called the Aanvullende Combinatiekort-
ing (Additional Combination Benefit).
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Figure 3: Annual in-work benefit for primary and secondary earners with children
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Source: Tax Office.
Figure 4: Annual in-work benefit for secondary earners with children
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Source: Tax Office.
Secondary earners (and single parents) qualify for this in-work benefit, but the primary
earners do not. This benefit was introduced in 2004. Up to 2008, there was a gradual
increase in the benefit, and the size of the benefit did not depend on earned income (again
provided that earned income exceeded a certain low threshold of approximately 25% of
the annual gross minimum wage). In 2009 this benefit became income dependent, with
a phase-in rate of 3.8% for income above the threshold. The maximum benefit in 2009
was 1,765 euro, where the maximum was reached at a gross individual income of 30,803
euro.18
As Figure 3 and 4 show, there was a shift from the Combination Benefit, for which
both primary and secondary earners were eligible, to the Income-Dependent Combination
Benefit, for which only secondary earners (and single parents), typically mothers, were el-
igible. Indeed, public expenditures on the Combination Benefit dropped from 484 million
euro in 2005 to 0 in 2009, whereas public expenditures on the Income-Dependent Combi-
nation Benefit rose from 346 million euro in 2005 to 724 million euro in 2008, and then to
1,290 million euro in 2009 as the income dependent part was added, see Table 1.19 The
motivation for these changes in in-work benefits was that secondary earners were believed
to be more responsive to financial incentives than primary earners, and that policymakers
wanted to stimulate mothers in the Netherlands to work more hours per week.
3 Structural model and empirical methodology
Households are assumed to maximize a unitary household utility function. The systematic
part of household utility, U s, depends on disposable income y, hours worked by the male
hm, hours worked by the female hf , and hours of formal childcare used c.
20 For the
18For comparison, in 2009 the annual gross minimum wage of a fulltime worker was 18,013 euro.
19We could not find internationally comparable data on total public spending on in-work benefits for
families with children.
20We do not observe informal childcare in our administrative data set. In a robustness check we include
a proxy for the use of informal childcare as an additional argument in the utility function. We assume that
parents coordinate their hours worked so as to minimize the use of childcare. Total demand for childcare
then equals ctot = max((hm + hf − h), 0), where h equals hours per week in a fulltime job. The demand
for informal childcare is then given by cinf = max((ctot− c), 0), where for simplicity we do not distinguish
between informal care and hours spent at school for households with a youngest child 4–11 years of age.
Including informal childcare leads to similar labor supply and childcare elasticities as the base model, see
appendix E.
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functional form of U s we use the flexible log-quadratic specification
U s(ν) = ν ′Aν + b′ν + d′1[µ > 0],
ν = (log(y), log(1− hm/T ), log(1− hf/T ), log(c)),
µ = (hm, hf , c), (1)
with A being a symmetric matrix of quadratic coefficients and b being a vector of linear
coefficients corresponding to the vector of the aforementioned variables ν.21 The vector d
captures fixed costs of work for men and women and fixed costs of using formal childcare.
Since these fixed costs are specified in the utility metric, they represent an amalgamation
of different factors such as intrinsic disutility from work, or market frictions and other
costs related to job search and childcare use. We allow for preference variation through
observed individual and household characteristics x2, x3 and x4 in parameters b2, b3 and
b4
b2 = x
′
2β2, b3 = x
′
3β3, b4 = x
′
4β4, (2)
which are the linear utility terms in leisure of the male, leisure of the female, and hours
of formal childcare, respectively. The same variation is also allowed for the fixed costs
parameters d (for a full list of covariates used, see appendix C).
Disposable household income is given by
y = wmhm + wfhf − T (wm, hm, wf , hf ; q)− TC(pc, c; q) + S(pc, c, yt; q), (3)
where wm and wf denote the gross hourly wage for the male and the female,
22 T (.) denotes
taxes and employees’ premiums, q denotes individual and household characteristics, TC(.)
is the total cost of formal childcare, with pc denoting the price per hour of formal childcare,
and S(.) is the childcare subsidy, which depends on the hourly price of formal childcare,
the hours of formal childcare, taxable income yt and household characteristics (e.g. the
ages of the children).
Our econometric specification is based on a discrete choice model. Parents choose
their preferred combination of hours of work and hours of formal childcare from a finite
set of alternatives j ∈ {1, ..., J}. Disposable household income depends on these choices,
increasing in hours worked and decreasing in hours of formal childcare. For workers we
observe gross hourly wages which are used to compute the work-related part of income for
each alternative in the choice set. For non-workers we simulate wages using estimates from
21Note that the parental work variables hm and hf in the vector ν have been transformed into indicators
of leisure utilization, representing the fraction of weekly time endowment T which is spent on activities
unrelated to work (including self-provided childcare and other household production).
22We assume that the gross hourly wage does not depend on the hours worked.
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a Heckman selection model. We account for wage heterogeneity by taking multiple draws
from the estimated wage error distribution. Similarly, for households that use formal
childcare we use observed hourly prices of formal childcare, and for non-users we simulate
hourly prices using a Heckman selection model for gross hourly childcare prices, again
taking multiple draws from the estimated gross hourly price error distribution.23
Next to the systematic part U s(νj), the utility function also contains alternative-
specific stochastic terms εj :
U(νj) = U
s(νj) + εj . (4)
The stochastic terms are assumed to be i.i.d. across alternatives, and to be drawn from
the Type 1 Extreme Value distribution. This leads to a multinomial logit specification of
the discrete choice model (McFadden, 1978).
We also allow for the possibility that families which are observationally equivalent
might have different tastes for work and formal childcare. Specifically, we assume that
there is a finite number K of latent household classes (or types), with households having
homogeneous preferences within each class but heterogeneous preferences across classes.
In practice, this means that we estimate a finite mixture model with K parametrizations
of the utility function, corresponding to K distinct subsets of our data. All the preference
parameters therefore become class-specific, which is equivalent to the assumption that they
are drawn from a mass-point distribution.24 The full set of parameters to be estimated is
then
θ = (θ1, ..., θK) = (A1,b1,d1, ...,AK ,bK ,dK). (5)
Since the classes are by definition unobservable, we cannot determine whether a given
household belongs to a specific class or not. Instead, we have to construct household-level
probabilities of class membership Pi(class = k), which reflect how likely is household i
to be driven by the preferences corresponding to class k, conditional on the household’s
choices and other observable characteristics. These probabilities are then used as individ-
ual weights for a set of class-specific multinomial logit models with separate parameter
23A detailed description of the empirical specification and the estimation results for the Heckman
selection models for gross hourly wages and gross hourly childcare prices can be found in appendices A
and B, respectively.
24Limiting the distributional assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity by using mass points was
pioneered by Heckman and Singer (1984). Recently, Train (2008) has shown that the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm offers a tractable way of estimating latent class discrete choice models.
Indeed, the likelihood frontier is likely to violate global concavity, which renders the solution by conven-
tional methods based on maximum likelihood practically infeasible. For a discussion of the benefits of
latent class models within the domain of structural labor supply modelling, see Apps et al. (2012). For an
overview of their implementation and potential computational improvements, see Kaba´tek (2013).
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vectors θk. The resulting log-likelihood function of the finite mixture model has the fol-
lowing form
L =
I∑
i=1
log
 1R
R∑
r=1
K∑
k=1
Pi(class = k) ·
J∑
j=1
 exp
(
U sij(νr, θk)
)
J∑
j′=1
exp
(
U sij′(νr, θk)
) ·Dij

, (6)
where R denotes the number of draws from the estimated wage and price equation for
non-workers and non-users of formal childcare.25 Dij is an indicator function which takes
the value 1 for the observed choice, and zero otherwise.
4 Data
We use the Labour Market Panel (LMP, Arbeidsmarktpanel in Dutch) of Statistics Nether-
lands (2012). The LMP is a large administrative household panel data set with annual
data for the period 1999–2009. The LMP contains a rich set of individual and household
characteristics, including gender, month and year of birth, the highest completed level of
education and ethnicity for all adult members of the household, the ages of the children
and the area of residence. The LMP also contains administrative data on hours worked
and gross income from different sources (wages, profits, benefits etc.). Furthermore, the
LMP contains administrative data on the use and gross hourly price of formal childcare for
each child participating in formal childcare. Unfortunately, the data on formal childcare
is only available for the shorter period 2006–2009, hence we restrict the analysis to this
period.
We make the following selections to arrive at the sample we use in the estimations.
Childcare subsidies are available to parents up to the point where the child goes to sec-
ondary school. Most children are 12 when they go to secondary school26, and therefore
we restrict the sample to couples with a youngest child 0 up to and including 11 years
of age. We exclude couples in which at least one parent is either self-employed (8% of
observations) or has multiple sources of income (7% of the remaining observations), be-
cause we can not determine their budget constraint. Furthermore, we exclude couples in
which at least one of the partners is on disability or unemployment benefits (3% of the
remaining observations), assuming that they are constrained in their labor supply choice.
25The number of draws in our specification is 10, and it is kept relatively low to limit the computational
complexity of the model. Increasing the number of draws did not change the predictions of our model.
26We do not observe whether a child is in secondary school or not.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by gender and by age of the youngest child
Men Women
0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 36.8 4.90 43.3 5.10 34.1 4.40 40.8 4.60
Native 0.84 0.36 0.86 0.35 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37
Western immigrant 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28
Non-Western immigrant 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.26
Lower educateda 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.34 0.22 0.42
Middle educateda 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.50
Higher educateda 0.38 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.26 0.44
Large cityb 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36
Small cityb 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.36 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.36
Hourly gross wage 20.2 10.0 22.2 11.2 16.3 6.30 16.1 7.60
Participation rate 0.96 0.19 0.95 0.21 0.82 0.39 0.75 0.43
Hours worked per weekc 38.7 5.20 38.7 5.50 23.0 8.20 21.2 8.50
Using formal childcare 0.50 0.50 0.13 0.34 0.50 0.50 0.13 0.34
Hours formal childcare per weekd 27.1 16.2 14.4 11.1 27.1 16.2 14.4 11.1
Observations 4,170 5,013 4,170 5,013
aEducation is classified as follows (using the Dutch abbreviations): i) lower educated = BO and VMBO,
ii) middle educated = MBO, HAVO and VWO, iii) higher education = HBO and WO. bA city is defined as
large (small) when it has 150,000 inhabitants or more (less than 150,000 inhabitants). cHours worked per
week per employed. dHours of formal childcare per week per couple using formal childcare.
After these selections are made, we further drop couples with missing information on in-
dividual or household characteristics (7% of the remaining observations). This leaves us
with 61,220 observations (couples times periods in the sample). Given the large set of
discrete choices we allow (see below), and the large set of preference parameters for each
latent class, estimating the preference parameters results in a considerable computational
burden. We therefore take a random subsample of 15%.27 This leaves us with 4,170 ob-
servations for couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age (pre-primary school age)28,
and 5,013 observations for couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of age (primary school
age).
27We have tested the stability of the preferences and the elasticities using different subsample sizes.
Moving from smaller to larger sample sizes, preferences and elasticities stabilize once we take a 15%
subsample.
28Maternity leave in the Netherlands is rather short, 3 months after the birth of the child, which can
be supplemented with 3 months of parental leave for which the replacement rate is rather low however
(OECD, 2014). Hence, we also include parents with a youngest child less than 1 years old in the analysis.
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Table 2 gives descriptive statistics of our sample. Fathers in our sample are on average
a few years older than mothers. Fathers and mothers in our sample are predominantly
born in the Netherlands, and most of them have a level of education classified as middle.
Fathers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age are slightly more likely to be higher educated
than fathers with a youngest child 4–11 years of age. However, mothers with a youngest
child 0–3 years of age are considerably more likely to be higher educated than mothers with
a youngest child 4–11 years of age, a cohort effect that also contributes to the relatively
high participation rate of mothers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age compared to
mothers with a youngest child 4-11 years of age. In general, cohort effects should be
kept in mind when interpreting the estimation results for both samples. The majority of
couples lives in smaller cities and towns (<150,000 inhabitants).29 There is a considerable
gap in the gross hourly wage between fathers and mothers, with fathers earning on average
4 to 6 euros per hour more than mothers in couples with a youngest child 0–3 and 4–11
years of age, respectively. The participation rate is higher for fathers than for mothers.
Furthermore, the participation rate of mothers with a youngest child 0–3 is higher than
the participation rate of mothers with a youngest child 4–11 (due to the cohort effect
discussed before). Finally, couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age are more likely
to use formal childcare than households with older children. 50% of the households with
a youngest child 0–3 years of age sends their children to formal childcare30, compared to
13% for couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of age. A typical school day is from 8:30
to 15:00, and many families are able to cover the remaining hours with parental time or
informal care. This is also reflected in the average hours of formal childcare used per week
by couples that do use formal childcare, which is much lower for couples with a youngest
child 4–11 years of age.
We discretize the data for the discrete choice model. Both parents can choose from
6 labor supply options: working 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 days per week, where each day equals
8 hours.31 For childcare, we allow for 0, 1, 2 and 3 days32, where the data show that a
typical day in a daycare centre equals 10 hours33, and a typical day in out-of-school care
29Most cities in the Netherlands have less than 150,000 inhabitants.
30The share of households using formal childcare is higher than the share of children in formal childcare
in Figure 1. Figure 1 also includes children from households who are not eligible for childcare subsidies
such as households with disability benefits. Furthermore, households that have many children typically
use less formal childcare on average.
31Classified as: 0 ∈ [0, 5), 8 ∈ [5, 13), 16 ∈ [13, 21), 24 ∈ [21, 29), 32 ∈ [29, 37), 40 ∈ [37,∞).
32The data show that using formal childcare for more than 3 days per week is rare in the Netherlands.
The remaining childcare needs are usually accomodated by informal carers or parental time.
33Classified as: 0 ∈ [0, 0], 10 ∈ [0, 15), 20 ∈ [15, 25), 30 ∈ [25,∞).
16
equals 5 hours.34 The full choice set for each household is 6 · 6 · 4 = 144 alternatives.
To determine disposable household income in each discrete option we use the advanced
tax-benefit calculator MIMOSI (Romijn et al., 2008). MIMOSI is the official tax-benefit
calculator of the Dutch government for the (non-behavioral) analysis of the redistribu-
tional and budgetary effects of reform proposals. MIMOSI allows for a very accurate
calculation of the budget constraints. Indeed, it takes into account all (national35) taxes,
social security premiums, and income independent subsidies and tax credits. Furthermore,
MIMOSI also calculates the childcare subsidy applicable for each household in each op-
tion. The subsidy depends on the gross hourly price of childcare per type of childcare (e.g.
daycare or out-of-school care) up to a maximum price beyond which parents receive no
additional subsidy, household income (subsidies are lower for higher incomes), the number
of children (the subsidy is higher for the second, third etc. child in formal childcare), and
whether or not both parents work (both parents need to work to receive the subsidy36).
Income that enters the household utility function is disposable household income defined
as gross household income plus childcare subsidies minus taxes, employees’ premiums (for
the employed), the nominal health care fee, and expenditures on formal childcare.37 In
accordance with the law, we ensure that household disposable income (excluding child-
care costs and childcare subsidies) can not drop below the social assistance (subsistance)
level for couples with children. For each discrete option we also calculate the net transfer
from the household to the government (positive or negative). This allows for an accurate
calculation of the net budgetary costs of the reforms excluding and including behavioral
responses.
5 Estimation results
We estimate the preferences separately for couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age,
and for couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of age. This is to acknowledge that there
can be non-trivial differences in childcare requirements and labor supply incentives faced
by the two groups of households (Bernal, 2008).
As discussed in Section 3, to account for unobserved heterogeneity, we allow each group
34Classified as: 0 ∈ [0, 0], 5 ∈ [0, 7.5), 10 ∈ [7.5, 12.5), 15 ∈ [12.5,∞).
35Local taxes account for only a small portion of total taxes in the Netherlands (3.3% in 2007, European
Union (2014)).
36When one of the parents becomes unemployed, the couple is still entitled to childcare subsidies for
the remainder of the fiscal year.
37Disposable income in the estimations and simulations is in 2006 prices. We use the CPI to convert
prices in later years to 2006.
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of households to be further divided into several unobserved types (latent classes). In or-
der to assess how many latent classes should be used, we have estimated a set of models
allowing for 1, 2, 3 or 4 latent classes (the model with one class being a homogenous spec-
ification). The key variables of interest, the labor supply and formal childcare elasticities,
prove to be relatively stable for specifications with two and more latent classes, see Table
A.5 and A.6 in appendix D. Therefore we have decided to use the most parsimonious
model which would generate elasticities qualitatively similar to those of more-stratified
models, opting for the specification with two latent classes.
The estimated preference parameters and aggregate class shares for the models with 2
latent classes can be found in the appendix (Table A.3 and A.4). Rather than interpreting
the individual coefficients, we focus on elasticities derived from the estimated structural
parameters. First, consider the labor supply elasticities in Table 3. For an increase in
the gross hourly wage of men, we find a total hours worked elasticity for men (‘Labour
supply men’) of 0.06 (youngest child 4–11) and 0.08 (youngest child 0–3), where most of
the response is on the decision whether or not to participate (‘Extensive margin’) and
not on the decision on how many hours per week to work (‘Intensive margin’). We find
a sizeable negative cross-elasticity for total hours worked by women.38 We also find a
modest elasticity of the use of formal childcare with respect to the gross hourly wage of
men.
We find much larger own-wage elasticities for women than for men. Indeed, the own-
wage elasticity for mothers with a youngest child 0–3 and 4–11 is 0.40 and 0.47, respec-
tively. About two-thirds of the response is on the extensive margin, and about one-third
is on the intensive margin.39 We also find negative cross-elasticities for men, but these
cross-elasticities are considerably smaller than for women. Following the larger female
labor supply response to female wages than male wages, we also find a larger elaticity of
the use of formal childcare with respect to the gross hourly wage of women than of men.
Table 4 presents the formal childcare price elasticities. In the first three rows, we
consider the elasticity of the use of formal childcare, labor supply by men and labor
supply by women with respect to the change in the gross price of formal childcare. We
see a substantial negative price elasticity of formal childcare: –0.66 for couples with a
youngest child 0–3 years of age and –0.77 for couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of
age. There is hardly any effect on the labor supply of men, but a significant negative effect
38However, note that women work fewer hours than men. In the end, the effect on total hours worked
by both spouses is therefore close to zero (not reported in the table).
39Bargain et al. (2014) also find that intensive margin responses for women in couples are relatively
high in the Netherlands. Indeed, women in the Netherlands are arguably more free to choose their working
hours, given the large share of part-time working women in the Netherlands.
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Table 3: Gross wage elasticities
Hourly wage men +1% Hourly wage women +1%
0–3 yrs 4–11 yrs 0–3 yrs 4–11 yrs
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Labour supply men 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02 –0.05 0.01 –0.04 0.02
– Extensive margin 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.03 –0.02 0.01 –0.01 0.02
– Intensive margin 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 –0.03 0.01 –0.03 0.02
Labour supply women –0.15 0.03 –0.08 0.02 0.40 0.03 0.47 0.03
– Extensive margin –0.10 0.02 –0.04 0.02 0.25 0.03 0.31 0.04
– Intensive margin 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.02
Formal childcare 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.41 0.02 0.77 0.11
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 draws.
Table 4: Gross and net price of formal childcare elasticities
Price of formal childcare +1%
0–3 yrs 4–11 yrs
Mean SE Mean SE
Gross price elasticities
Formal childcare –0.66 0.03 –0.77 0.10
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Labour supply women –0.14 0.01 –0.04 0.01
Net price elasticities
Formal childcare –0.41 0.02 –0.54 0.07
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Labour supply women –0.09 0.01 –0.03 0.01
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 draws. The gross price of formal
childcare elasticities relate the percentage change in the use of formal childcare
and labor supply by men and women to the percentage change in the full price
of formal childcare. The net price of formal childcare elasticities relate the
percentage change in the use of formal childcare and labor supply by men and
women to the percentage change in the parental fee for formal childcare.
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Table 5: Comparison with DD analysis: policy reforms 2005–2009
Structural model DD analysisb
Childcare Combination Income-Depend. Total Coefficient SE
Credit Combi. Credit
Model with latent classesa Changes in levels
Youngest child 0-3 yrs
Participation rate women 0.017 -0.005 0.018 0.030 0.020 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.693 -0.098 0.566 1.185 1.222 0.223
Participation rate men 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.059 -0.017 0.024 0.075 –0.509 0.237
Youngest child 4-11 yrs
Participation rate women 0.004 -0.008 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.173 -0.133 0.566 0.616 0.750 0.221
Participation rate men 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.016 0.005 -0.027 -0.001 –0.180 0.234
Model without latent classes
Youngest child 0-3 yrs
Participation rate women 0.017 -0.005 0.018 0.030 0.020 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.671 -0.091 0.549 1.147 1.222 0.223
Participation rate men 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.069 -0.030 0.045 0.091 –0.509 0.237
Youngest child 4-11 yrs
Participation rate women 0.002 -0.004 0.015 0.013 0.022 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.101 -0.078 0.418 0.445 0.750 0.221
Participation rate men 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.020 -0.029 0.061 0.056 –0.180 0.234
a2 latent classes. bDD estimates drawn from the same sample as in Bettendorf et al. (2015), full regression results available on
request.
on the labor supply of women. This is particularly true for women with a youngest child
0–3 years of age, who use much more formal childcare than women with a youngest child
4–11 years of age. The next three rows give the same elasticities with respect to the net
price of formal childcare or the parental fee of formal childcare. A 1% increase in the gross
price leads to more than a 1% increase in the average parental fee because a fraction of
the parents pays a gross price that is higher than the maximum price for which they can
get a subsidy. Hence, these parents have to bear the full 1% rise in the gross price. The
net price elasticities are more directly comparable to other studies, that typically focus
on the elasticity with respect to the parental fee. These elasticities are somewhat smaller,
but still substantial with –0.41 for couples with a youngest child 0–3 and –0.54 for couples
with a youngest child 4–11.40 Our results for the net price elasticity of labor supply by
women is in line with the review presented in Blau (2003, p. 492). For the studies that
explicitly allow for a formal childcare choice next to a labor supply choice, and hence do
not impose a 1-to-1 link between the two, the elasticity of labor supply of women with
respect to the net price of formal childcare is relatively low, ranging from –0.09 to –0.20.
For mothers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age, we find a similar low elasticity of
–0.09. For mothers with a youngest child 4–11 the elasticity is even lower (–0.03), which
is partly a result of the lower share of women using formal care in this group.41
Table 5 compares the predictions of the structural model with the results of a quasi-
experimental study. Bettendorf et al. (2015) analyse the employment effects of the reforms
discussed in Section 2 using difference-in-differences (DD). The identification in Betten-
dorf et al. (2015) comes mostly from the intertemporal dimension, using a before–after
comparison with data for the period 1995–2009. The identification in our analysis comes
in part from intertemporal variation from the policy reforms in the period 2006–2009, but
in part also from the cross-sectional variation. Bettendorf et al. (2015) present estima-
tion results for mothers with a youngest child 0–11 years of age, but this includes single
mothers. Furthermore, they report effects for a different classification of mothers (with a
youngest child 0–3, 4–7 and 8–11 of age). To make the comparison with the DD as clean
as possible, we used the same initial sample as Bettendorf et al. (2015) but we estimate
responses for the subgroups we consider in our empirical analysis, that is men and women
in couples with a youngest child 0–3 or 4–11 years of age. The results are given in Table
5, along with the simulation results for the estimated structural model.
Table 5 shows that the results for the structural model are very much in line with the
40For example, in a recent study for Australia, Gong and Breunig (2012, Table 4) calculate a net price
elasticity of childcare of –0.22.
41Table A.7 in appendix E gives the resulting elasticities when we include a proxy for informal childcare.
The elasticities are similar to the base model.
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results of the DD analysis for mothers. Indeed, we can not reject that the DD estimates
for the effect on hours worked and participation of mothers are equal to the simulated
effects. The estimated effects on the participation rate of fathers is again very much in
line with the prediction from the structural model, and we can not reject that they are the
same. For the intensive margin, for fathers with a youngest child 4–11 years of age, the
DD analysis suggests a smaller negative effect on hours worked per week by the employed
than the structural model, although the coefficient is not significantly different from the
prediction of the structural model. The only coefficient of the DD analysis which differs
significantly from the prediction of the structural model is the intensive margin response
by fathers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age, for which the DD analysis suggests a
larger, negative response than the structural model.
Table 5 also shows the predictions of the structural model when we do not allow for
latent classes. In this case the predictions of the structural model move away from the DD
estimates, in particular for hours worked per week by women in couples with a youngest
child 4–11 years of age. Hence, a comparison with the DD analysis seems to favor a model
with latent classes over a model with homogenous treatment of preferences.
6 Relative effectiveness of fiscal stimuli
We use the empirical model to study the effectiveness of different fiscal stimuli for working
couples with children. The policy reforms we consider are motivated by the actual reforms
that have occured in the Netherlands over the past decade. However, since many countries
have witnessed, or are considering, similar types of reforms, we believe that the relevance
of our results extends well beyond the borders of the Netherlands.
We consider three types of fiscal stimuli for working parents: i) an increase in childcare
subsidies, ii) the introduction of an (additional) in-work benefit for secondary earners, and
iii) the introduction of an in-work benefit for both primary and secondary earners. For
each of these fiscal stimuli we consider two types of reforms: a) a subsidy/benefit that does
not depend on income, and b) a subsidy/benefit that rises with income. Comparing the
results for the income independent and income dependent subsidy/benefit we can study to
what extent there is an equity-efficiency trade-off for the different types of fiscal stimuli.
The baseline scenario is the subsidy scheme of the childcare subsidy in 2009, applied
to all years in our data set, with an average subsidy rate for childcare of 76%. To make
the impulses comparable, in all simulations we consider the effects of a reform that costs
100 million euro given the initial distribution of labor supply and childcare choices. Then,
when we calculate the effectiveness of the different policies, we compare the increase in
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total hours worked to the public expenditures including behavioral responses. Indeed, so-
called knock-on effects on public expenditures will play an important role in the relative
effectiveness.
First, we consider the results for the following three reforms:
(1) An increase in the childcare subsidy by 10.3%-points of the hourly price.
(2) An annual in-work benefit for secondary earners of 290 euro.
(3) An annual in-work benefit for primary and secondary earners of 126 euro.
Figure 5, 7 and 9 give the redistributional effects of these reforms, respectively. On the
horizontal axis is initial disposable household income, on the vertical axis is the percentage
change in disposable household income. None of these reforms depends directly on income:
the absolute change in disposable income is the same for low and high income households
that use the same formal childcare and have the same number of partners employed. How-
ever, because we present redistributional effects in percentage terms, percentage changes
in disposable income are lower for high income households, ceteris paribus. For the child-
care reform in Figure 5 we see a number of ‘lines’, as families differ in their number of
children, and the number of days of formal childcare they use. Although the change in
the subsidy itself does not depend on income, it is implicitly targeted more at middle
and higher incomes because they use more formal childcare than lower-income families.
Accordingly, there is a positive effect of the reform on the Gini-coefficient for disposable
household income (before behavioral changes), reported in column (1) in Table 6. Figure
7 shows two lines for the in-work benefit for secondary earners. One line on the horizontal
axis for couples in which at least one of the partners does not work, and a second, higher
line for two-earner couples. As low income households benefit more in percentage terms,
this reform leads to a decline in the Gini-coefficient, see column (2) in Table 6. Finally,
Figure 9 gives the redistributional effects of the in-work benefit for both primary and sec-
ondary earners. Here we see three lines, one for two-earner households, one for one-earner
households and one for households in which neither of the two parents works. This reform
is targeted even more at lower incomes, in percentage terms, and the Gini-coefficient falls
the most in this scenario, see column (3) in Table 6.
Table 6 presents the effects on labor participation, formal childcare and public finances.
Column (1) gives the results for the increase in the childcare subsidy. First, consider the
effects on labor participation of couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age. The
overall effect on hours worked by men is small. However, there is a substantial positive
effect on both the extensive and the intensive margin for women.We observe similar though
23
Effect on initial incomes: childcare subsidies
Figure 5: Not targeted
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Figure 6: Targeted more at higher incomes
0
2
4
6
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 d
is
po
sa
bl
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
in
co
m
e 
(in
 %
)
20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Disposable household income (in euro)
Effect on initial incomes: in-work benefit for secondary earners with children
Figure 7: Not targeted
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Figure 8: Targeted more at higher incomes
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Effect on initial incomes: in-work benefit for primary and secondary earners with children
Figure 9: Not targeted
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Figure 10: Targeted more at higher incomes
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Table 6: Effectiveness of fiscal stimuli of 100 million euro
Not targeted Targeted more at higher incomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Childcare In-work benefit In-work ben. Childcare In-work benefit In-work ben.
subsidy second. earners all parents subsidy second. earners all parents
Percentage changes
Inequality
Gini coefficient 0.35 -0.10 -0.34 0.93 0.53 -0.14
Labour supply
Labour supply total 0.55 0.28 0.09 0.56 0.44 0.11
Labour supply youngest child 0–3
– Men 0.04 0.03 –0.02 0.10 0.02 0.02
— Extensive margin 0.22 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.06
— Intensive margin –0.19 –0.09 –0.07 –0.06 –0.09 –0.04
– Women 2.44 0.75 0.23 2.29 1.34 0.27
— Extensive margin 1.52 0.89 0.34 1.19 0.73 0.13
— Intensive margin 0.90 –0.14 –0.11 1.10 0.61 0.14
Labour supply youngest child 4–11
– Men 0.03 –0.02 –0.03 0.05 –0.03 –0.01
— Extensive margin 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04
— Intensive margin 0.01 –0.08 –0.06 0.03 –0.09 –0.05
– Women 0.89 1.02 0.44 0.91 1.49 0.41
— Extensive margin 0.39 1.24 0.56 0.35 0.80 0.23
— Intensive margin 0.50 –0.21 –0.12 0.55 0.68 0.18
Formal childcare
Formal childcare total 12.62 1.28 0.67 11.13 2.12 0.79
Formal childcare youngest child 0–3 11.54 1.20 0.64 9.51 1.82 0.70
Formal childcare youngest child 4–11 16.28 1.54 0.80 16.61 3.12 1.09
Effectiveness Millions of euro
Additional public exp. ex ante 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Knock-on effect childcare subsidies 132.4 11.0 5.8 103.4 16.8 6.3
Knock-on effect taxes and benefits –52.7 –19.7 –4.8 –60.1 –33.5 –8.5
Additional public exp. ex post 179.7 91.3 101.0 143.3 83.3 97.8
Euro
Ex ante spending per FTE 28,135 55,269 179,070 27,782 35,211 142,829
Including effect on formal childcare use 65,374 61,323 189,402 56,509 41,122 151,859
Including effect on taxes and benefits 50,559 50,442 180,772 39,810 29,328 139,741
somewhat smaller labor supply effects for couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of age.
Children in primary school are less likely to go to formal childcare, and if they do they
typically go for only a few hours per day. Overall, total hours worked by couples with a
youngest child 0–11 years of age increases by 0.55%.
Couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age increase their demand for childcare by
11.54%, whereas couples with older children demand 16.28% more childcare. This corre-
sponds to an increase in hours of childcare per week of 1.77 and 0.33 hours, respectively.
Men in couples increase their labor supply by just 0.01 hours per week. The average in-
crease for women is 0.44 and 0.13 for mothers with a youngest child 0–3 and 4–11 years of
age, respectively. Hence, the rise in formal childcare is much bigger than the rise in total
hours worked, which underscores that there is not a 1-to-1 link with hours worked.
Finally, we consider the effects on public finances, excluding and including knock-on
effects. The increase in hours worked increases tax receipts and reduces benefit expen-
ditures by 53 million euro. However, this effect is dominated by the sizable increase of
childcare subsidy expenditures (132 million euro).42 Indeed, many couples switch to for-
mal childcare, and with an average subsidy rate for formal childcare in the base of 76% of
the gross hourly price, this makes the childcare reform rather costly to the government.
In the last three rows we calculate the additional public spending per additional fulltime
equivalent (fte) employed. Ignoring knock-on effects, additional public spending per ad-
ditional fte is 28 thousand euro. Taking into account the increase in formal childcare,
additional public spending per additional fte rises to 65 thousand euro. Finally, taking
into account additional tax receipts and savings on benefits, we arrive at 51 thousand euro
per additional fte.
Column (2) in Table 6 gives the behavioral responses and corresponding budgetary
effects for the in-work benefit targeted at secondary earners. The effect on the labor
supply of men is again small. In contrast to reform (1), the effect on hours worked by
women with children 0–3 years of age is smaller than the effect for women with older
children. This is due to the fact that the benefit is not conditioned on the use of formal
child care. A large part of the in-work benefit therefore goes to the mothers with a youngest
child 4–11 years of age who, due to their lower utilization of childcare, were not among the
main beneficiaries of the first reform. It is interesting to note that the intensive margin
response is negative for women with children in both age groups (for working women the
in-work benefit only generates an income effect).
Since the in-work benefit does not affect the price of formal childcare for parents,
reform (2) has only a modest effect on the use of formal childcare. This is also reflected
42The 132 million euro is in addition to the initial 100 million euro.
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in the knock-on effects for the government. Because reform (2) leads to lower overall
stimulation of hours worked, the knock-on effect in terms of taxes and benefits is smaller
than for reform (1). However, more important is the smaller knock-on effect in terms of
childcare subsidy expenditures. In the end, reform (2) generates a positive knock-on effect
of 9 million euro. For reform (2), ignoring knock-on effects, additional public spending
per additional fte employed is 55 thousand euro. Taking into account the positive and
negative knock-on effects, this becomes 50 thousand euro. Hence, taking into account the
knock-on effects, we find that reforms (1) and (2) are about equally effective in raising
additional labour supply per additional euro spent.43
Column (3) in Table 6 gives the results of the in-work benefit for both primary and
secondary earners. In this senario, a large part of the subsidies goes to men in couples
with children, who hardly respond to financial incentives. As a result, the effects are much
smaller than in reforms (1) and (2). We still see a positive effect on the extensive margin,
and a negative effect on the intensive margin (due to the income effect). The increase
in total hours worked is just 0.09%. The knock-on effects are therefore also small, and
close to zero overall. This makes the third scenario the most expensive reform in terms of
spending required per marginal full time worker. Indeed, additional public spending per
additional fte employed is close to 181 thousand euro.44 We should note though, that this
reform leads to a bigger drop in inequality than reform (2). With this effect on inequality
in mind, the results for reforms (1)–(3) suggest that the Dutch shift from the system of
in-work benefits for all parents to the system combining in-work benefits for secondary
earners and higher childcare subsidies was effective in terms of raising total hours worked.
Next, we consider the trade-off between equity and efficiency by simulating reforms
43Note however, that reform (1) goes at the expense of greater inequality, whereas reform (2) actually
reduces inequality.
44Even less effective for labor supply by couples would be an EITC along the lines of the EITC in the
US. The EITC in the US depends on household income and is targeted at low incomes, see e.g. Meyer
(2010) for an extensive discussion of the EITC in the US and the resulting behavioral responses. For
couples, this EITC increases the effective tax rate for the elastic group of secondary earners, both on the
extensive and the intensive margin. We simulate the introduction of the following EITC in our sample. For
households with one child, the phase-in range of the EITC runs from e0 to e8,971, with a phase-in rate
of 34%, until the maximum level of e3,051 is reached. Next, the EITC remains constant from e8,971 to
e16,457. The phase-out range runs from e16,457 to e35,545, with a phase-out rate of 16%. For households
with more than one child, the phase-in range of the EITC runs from e0 to e12,607, with a phase-in rate
of 40%, until the maximum level of e5,043 is reached. Next, the EITC remains constant from e12,607
to e16,457. The phase-out range runs from e16,457 to e40,402, with a phase-out rate of 21%. We find
that this EITC actually reduces labor supply by couples with children by 3.3%. These results are in line
with the findings of Eissa and Hoynes (2004), who report a large negative effect of the EITC on labor
participation by women in couples in the US.
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that are targeted more at middle and higher incomes. Specifically, we study the effects of
the following three reforms:
(4) An increase in childcare subsidies so that the parental fee falls by 41% for all incomes.
Given that middle and higher incomes pay a larger fee in the base, this reform targets
mostly middle and high income families.
(5) An in-work benefit for secondary earners starting at zero at an annual gross labor
income of 4,000 euro, and then rising with 2.2% per euro of income up to a maximum
of 581 euro at an income of 30,000 euro.
(6) An in-work benefit for primary and secondary earners in couples, starting at zero at
an annual gross labor income of 4,000 euro, and then rising with 0.6% of income up
to a maximum of 168 euro per year at an income of 30,000 euro.
The redistributional effects of these reforms are given in Figure 6, 8 and 10, respectively.
Reforms (4) and (5) increase income inequality (as measured by the Gini-coefficient) more
than reforms (1) and (2), see Table 6. Furthermore, reform (6) reduces inequality less than
reform (3). If there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency, we would expect these
reforms to be more effective in terms of labor supply and public spending per additional
fte employed. But is this actually true, and if so, how much of a difference does it make?
Column (4) in Table 6 gives the effects of the increase in childcare subsidies targeted
more at middle and high incomes. The effect on total labour supply is quite similar to
reform (1), with the effect on men being more favorable and the effect for women being less
favorable. There is no apparent trade-off for childcare subsidies when looking only at hours
worked. This suggests that the current system in the Netherlands, which targets subsidies
mostly at low incomes, is not detrimental to hours worked.45 However, the knock-on
effects are more favorable for reform (4) than reform (1). The additional hours worked
by middle and higher incomes generate more additional tax revenue per additional hour
worked. Furthermore, substitution of other types of care for formal care is less costly for
the government, as the subsidy per hour of formal childcare is lower for middle and higher
incomes than for lower incomes. With an about equal effect on total hours worked and
more favorable knock-on effects, additional public spending per additional fte employed
is more favorable in reform (4) than in reform (1), with 40 thousand euro in reform (4)
compared to 51 thousand euro in reform (1). However, the difference comes at the expense
45The case for targeting childcare subsidies at low income households becomes stronger when partici-
pation in childcare benefits children from low income households more than children from middle and high
income households, as suggested by the empirical evidence presented in e.g. Blau and Currie (2006) and
Havnes and Mogstad (2015).
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of additional income inequality, and hence, once we take into account the knock-on effects
on the government budget, there is actually a trade-off between equity and efficiency when
it comes to the targeting of childcare subsidies.
Column (5) shows that the in-work benefit for secondary earners that rises with income
has a bigger effect on hours worked than reform (2). Indeed, the substitution effect of this
reform makes the intensive margin responses by women positive rather than negative.
The effect on total hours worked is also considerably larger than reform (2), although
still smaller than the childcare reforms (1) and (4). However, because this reform does
not generate a large response in the use of formal childcare, the knock-on effects are
rather favorable. Indeed, when we calculate the additional expenditures per additional
fte employed, reform (5) is the most effective, with 29 thousand euro per additional fte
employed. This suggests that the Dutch reform in 2009, making the in-work benefit for
secondary earners income dependent, was rather effective. However, there is also a trade-
off here with equity, as the additional hours worked come at the expense of additional
income inequality.
Finally, column (6) gives the results of the income dependent in-work benefit for pri-
mary and secondary earners. The overall effect on hours worked and government finances
is slightly better than for the flat benefit for primary and secondary earners. Again, there
is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. However, this reform still has only a marginal
effect on overall hours worked and the costs per additional fte employed of 140 thousand
euro are still rather unfavorable.
Reforms (4)–(6) show that there is indeed a trade-off between equity and efficiency,
targeting fiscal stimuli more towards working parents with a middle or higher income
leads to a larger increase in hours worked per additional public euro spent. However, the
trade-off is less pronounced for childcare subsidies than for in-work benefits.
We conclude the discussion of the policy simulations with two important caveats.
First, we consider reforms starting out of a base in which the average childcare subsidy
rate is 76%. This makes a further increase in childcare subsidies rather costly for the
government, because for each additional hour of formal childcare the government has to
pay 76% on top of the increase in the childcare subsidy. To study the extent to which
the effectiveness of childcare subsidies falls with the level of the subsidy rate we have
simulated two more reforms: i) reducing childcare subsidies by 50%, and ii) reducing
childcare subsidies by 100%. The corresponding savings for the government per fte lost
are 40,375 and 29,933 euro, respectively. This shows that when we start from a very
low initial childcare subsidy rate, the marginal effectiveness of childcare subsidies can be
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comparable or even higher than in-work benefits for secondary earners.46 Second, childcare
subsidies and in-work benefits for secondary earners that increase in income may be more
effective in the Netherlands than in other countries. Indeed, Bargain et al. (2014) show
that intensive margin responses of women in couples in the Netherlands are relatively
large when compared to other developed countries. However, it is a priori unclear to what
extent this affects the relative effectiveness of childcare subsidies versus in-work benefits
for secondary earners.
7 Conclusion
We have estimated a structural model for couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age
(pre-primary school age) and couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of age (primary
school age), where we model the simultaneous choice over hours worked by fathers, hours
worked by mothers and the hours of formal childcare use. Large exogenous variation
in childcare subsidies and in-work benefits facilitates the identification of the structural
parameters. Furthermore, we account for unobserved heterogeneity by using a flexible
framework of latent class models. The model produces labor supply responses to reforms
over the period 2005–2009 similar to a difference-in-differences analysis.
We use this model to study the relative effectiveness of different types of fiscal stimuli
for working parents with young children. We find that the most effective fiscal stimulus
for working parents is an in-work benefit targeted at secondary earners that rises with
income. Childcare subsidies are less effective than in-work benefits for secondary earners,
because substitution of other types of care for formal care drives up public expenditures.
However, childcare subsidies are still much more effective than in-work benefits that target
both primary and secondary earners. Primary earners are rather unresponsive to financial
incentives. We also find that there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency for these
fiscal stimuli, the effect on hours worked per additional public euro spent is bigger when
we target the policies more at middle and high incomes. However, the trade-off is less
pronounced for childcare subsidies than for in-work benefits.
An interesting direction for future research would be to model these decisions in a life
cycle model (Blundell et al., 2013). Indeed, there may be career effects extending beyond
the period when the children are young. Another interesting avenue to consider is the
46This is in line with the findings of (Blau, 2003, pp. 506-507), who shows that starting from a base
where there is no childcare subsidy, a marginal increase in childcare subsidies is likely to be more cost-
effective than an in-work benefit for mothers (which is closely related to the income independent in-work
benefit for secondary earners we consider).
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effect of participation in formal childcare on the well-being of children and how they fare
later in life, and whether or not there is a difference between children from low income
and high income families (Havnes and Mogstad, 2015). Finally, the childcare reform may
have been more salient than the reform of in-work benefits. Indeed, Chetty et al. (2009)
stress the importance of salience in the behavioral responses to taxes and subsidies, and
this too seems an interesting topic for future research.
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A Wage equations
For the employed we use observed wages. For the non-employed we simulate wages. To this
end, we run wage regressions by gender and then by level of education, where education
is split into three levels (lower, middle and higher educated).
We use panel data techniques to account for unobserved individual-specific effects.
We perform a Hausman test in order to test whether random effects or fixed effects are
appropriate. For all groups, we reject the null hypothesis that the individual-specific effects
are uncorrelated with the regressor and therefore we prefer fixed effects over random effects
estimation. However, we lose information on time-invariant regressors with fixed effects
and therefore opt for the quasi-fixed effects model (Mundlak, 1978).
To account for the possibility of selection we first estimate the probability of partici-
pation using a pooled probit regression
pit = x
′
itγ + z
′
itθ + νit, (A.1)
where vector zit contains variables that are expected to have an effect on the probability
of participation but not on wages (an exclusion restriction). From this regression we
determine the inverse Mills’ ratio
invmillsit = φ(pit)/Φ(pit). (A.2)
The inverse Mills’ ratio is then included in the quasi-fixed effects model
ln(wit) = x
′
itβ + ωi + x¯i
′pi + λtinvmillsit + it (A.3)
where the individual specific effect consists of a random part, ωi with ∼ IID(0, σ2ω), and
a part which is allowed to be correlated with regressors x¯i
′pi. Here, x¯i is the average of
time-varying variables, such as age. A significant coefficient for an element of pi provides
evidence that the individual specific effect is correlated with one of the regressors.
Table A.1 shows estimation results for all subgroups. We use age splines since we
expect that the relationship between wage and age is nonlinear. Table A.1 shows that the
wage increases with age but at a diminishing rate. For both singles and couples we see
that the age profile is steeper for higher educated individuals. We also include cohort and
year dummies in the regression. Because of perfect collinearity between age, cohort and
period we use transformed time dummies following Deaton and Paxson (1994). The time
dummies for 2006 and 2007 depend on the dummies for later years and are calculated
manually.47 Year dummies are significant in most specifications while the cohort variables
47t2006=-(d2007+d2008+d2009) and t2007=-2*d2008-3*d2009
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Table A.1: Wage equations
Men Women
Lower Middle Higher Lower Middle Higher
educ. educ. educ. educ. educ. educ.
Age
18–30 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
31–40 0.020∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
41–50 0.013∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
51–63 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
Cohorta
1980–1989 0.085∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
1975–1980 0.025 0.074∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
1970–1975 0.019* 0.034∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
1960–1965 0.010 –0.017∗∗∗ –0.012 –0.008 –0.019∗∗∗ –0.044∗∗∗
1955–1960 –0.002 –0.031∗∗∗ –0.043∗∗∗ 0.009 –0.027** –0.064∗∗∗
<1955 0.007 0.002 –0.012 0.010 –0.019* –0.046∗∗∗
Ethnicititya
Western immigrant 0.003 –0.068∗∗∗ –0.055∗∗∗ 0.001 –0.026∗∗∗ –0.032∗∗∗
Non-Western immigrant –0.062∗∗∗ –0.231∗∗∗ –0.291∗∗∗ –0.051∗∗∗ –0.074∗∗∗ –0.114∗∗∗
Partner
Married 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ –0.011** –0.015∗∗∗ –0.025∗∗∗
Year
2006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.002
2007 –0.006 –0.006 –0.003 –0.007 –0.005 –0.002
2008 –0.002∗∗∗ –0.003∗∗∗ –0.007∗∗∗ –0.004∗∗∗ –0.003∗∗∗ –0.003∗∗∗
2009 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Mundlak averages age
18–30 –0.008* 0.000 –0.005 –0.003 –0.002 0.001
31–40 –0.006** –0.003** 0.000 –0.012∗∗∗ –0.008∗∗∗ –0.004∗∗∗
41–50 –0.008∗∗∗ –0.007∗∗∗ –0.014∗∗∗ –0.022∗∗∗ –0.016∗∗∗ –0.017∗∗∗
51–63 –0.008∗∗∗ –0.015∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗ –0.018∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗
Inverse Mills’ ratio –0.329∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ –0.008 0.026** 0.098∗∗∗
Attrition indicator –0.004 –0.001 –0.001 –0.004 –0.004 0.000
Constant 1.446∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗
Observations 88,997 168,316 129,663 60,824 146,294 89,859
Individuals 26,779 49,634 37,742 19,385 44,262 26,770
a Reference group: born in 1965–1970 and autochtonous. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
are jointly significant for most subgroups. Wages are lower on average for non-Western
immigrants. The coefficients for the Mundlak age averages are joinly significant in all
specifications, but have no straightforward economic interpretation.
The lower part of Table A.1 shows that the inverse Mills’ ratio is significant for most
groups. Hence, we have evidence that selection bias is present for most groups. We also
include an attrition indicator in order to test for the presence of attrition bias.48 The
attrition indicator is not significant for all subgroups.
48The attrition indicator is a dummy which equals 1 if an individual leaves the sample in our data
period 2006–2009.
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B Price equations formal childcare
For non-users of formal childcare we have to simulate a price for childcare. We have
information on the use of formal childcare in the Netherlands for the period 2006–2009.
Here, a distinction is made between daycare (children 0–3 years of age) and out-of-school
care (children 4–11 years of age).
Again, we estimate a quasi-fixed effects model for the prices of daycare and out-of-
school care.49 Here, we follow the same procedure as for the wage estimations and estimate
the following price equation:
pit = x
′
itβ + ωi + x¯i
′pi + λtinvmillsit + it (A.4)
where the individual specific effect consists of a random part, ωi with ∼ IID(0, σ2ω), and
a part which is allowed to be correlated with regressors x¯i
′pi. Here, x¯i is the average of
age, which does not vary over time. Our dependent variable is the hourly real price.
We focus on households since childcare is consumed at the household level. As it turns
out, characteristics of females are more important in predicting the use and gross price of
childcare than characteristics of men. Hence, we only include females characteristics in
the regressions.
Table A.2 shows estimation results for daycare and out-of-school care.50 Estimation
results show that year dummies are significantly increasing for daycare. However, time
effects are less important in the price equation for out-of-school care. Households with
higher educated women or younger women pay a higher price on average. We do not find
evidence that selection bias or attrition bias are present.
49We conduct a Hausman test in order to test whether fixed or random effects is appropriate. In all
cases, the Hausman test favors the fixed effects model.
50Including a squared term for age, age splines, ethnicity, a dummy for age of the youngest child or a
dummy for multiple children one at a time, leads to insignificant coefficients for each of these variables.
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Table A.2: Price equation formal childcare
Daycare Out-of-school care
Year
2007 0.058∗∗∗ 0.015
2008 0.123∗∗∗ 0.025
2009 0.153∗∗∗ 0.035
Higher educated womena 0.000 0.020∗
Age women –0.017∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
Single parent 0.033∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
Mundlak age average 0.014∗∗ 0.026∗∗
Inverse Mills’ ratio –0.032 -0.008
Attrition indicator –0.001 0.005
Constant 5.507∗∗∗ 5.741∗∗∗
Observations 35,675 28,938
Households 14,984 12,015
a Reference group: lower educated women in couples.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
C Preferences and fit of preferred model
Table A.3: Preferences by latent class, youngest child 0–3 yrs
Latent class 1 2 1 2
Income 6.164∗∗ 15.812∗∗∗ Fixed costs men -8.885∗∗∗ -11.758∗∗∗
Leisure men -66.223∗∗∗ -74.155∗∗∗ *Lower education 1.539∗∗ 0.522
*Age 0.367 0.663 *Middle education 1.483∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗
*Age2 0.260∗ -1.393 *Non-Western immigrant -0.830∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗
*Western immigrant -1.682∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗
Leisure female -21.914∗∗∗ -19.814∗∗
*Age 2.936 1.375 Fixed costs women -2.520∗∗∗ -2.550∗∗∗
*Age2 2.348 2.872 *Lower education 0.836 -0.674∗∗∗
*Middle education 0.484∗∗ 0.162
Income2 2.250∗∗ -3.646∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigrant -1.144∗∗∗ -1.412∗∗∗
Income*leisure men 21.444∗∗∗ -2.799 *Western immigrant -0.284 -0.868∗∗
Income*leisure women 5.391 -8.189
Leisure men2 -48.270 -14.755∗∗∗ Fixed cost childcare 0.690 0.365
Leisure women2 -126.255∗∗∗ -167.628∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigr. men -0.254 -0.466
Leisure men*leisure women -0.392 -11.813 *Western immigrant men 0.993 -0.664
*Lower education men -0.428∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗
Childcare -2.895∗∗∗ -1.637∗∗ *Middle education men -0.267∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗
*Urban area 0.643∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigr. women -1.598 -1.261
*Non-Western immigr. men -0.644 -0.135 *Western immigrant women -0.999 -0.147
*Western immigrant men 0.841 0.587∗∗ *Lower education women -1.737∗∗∗ -0.766∗∗
*Non-Western immigr. women 0.999 0.979 *Middle education women -0.461∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗
*Western immigrant women 0.365 0.164 *Urban area -0.859 -1.619∗∗
Childcare2 0.878 -0.135 Relative class shares 48% 52%
Childcare*income 0.943∗∗∗ 0.477∗
Childcare*leisure men 0.854 1.159
Childcare*leisure women -5.781∗∗∗ -7.935∗∗∗
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.4: Preferences by latent class, youngest child 4–11 yrs
Latent class 1 2 1 2
Income 3,313*** -10,189*** Fixed costs men -4,935*** -27,306***
Leisure men -22,692 -301,521*** *education low 0,504* -0,098
*age -2,875 17,586*** *education mid 1,067*** -0,503
*age2 2,597** -3,716*** *non-Western immigrant -0,520 -2,961***
*Western immigrant -1,132*** 2,719***
Leisure female -11,029 -61,631***
*age 0,301 2,436* Fixed costs women -1,205*** -2,684***
*age2 -1,426 6,689*** *education low -0,557*** -0,044
*education mid -0,236** 0,064
Income2 -0,981** 11,441*** *non-Western immigrant 0,405** -1,752***
Income*leisure men -3,274*** 59,227*** *Western immigrant -0,398 0,313*
Income*leisure women -2,971*** 26,830***
Leisure men2 -12,534 -425,783*** Fixed cost childcare -3,484*** -2,257***
Leisure women2 -57,708*** -201,181*** *non-Western immigr. men -0,778** -0,327
Leisure men*leisure women -17,181 25,459 *Western immigr. men 1,008 -1,847**
*education low men 0,065* -0,101
Childcare -2,637** -4,094*** *education mid men -0,534* -0,113
*urban area 0,748* -0,571 *non-Western immigr. women 0,109 0,991
*non-Western immigr. men 2,075* -2,146 *Western immigr. women 1,441** 0,482*
*Western immigr. men -0,176 1,396 *education low women -2,247*** -0,703*
*non-Western immigr. women -1,074 0,960 *education mid women -0,256 -0,287
*Western immigr. women -1,742*** -0,304 *urban area -0,686 1,086*
Childcare2 -0,468 -1,017*** Relative class shares 44% 56%
Childcare*income 0,170* 1,425***
Childcare*leisure men -7,435*** -5,463*
Childcare*leisure women -7,980*** -13,451***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fit labor supply men
Figure A.1: Age youngest child 0–3 yrs
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Figure A.2: Age youngest child 4–11 yrs
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Fit labor supply women
Figure A.3: Age youngest child 0–3 yrs
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Figure A.4: Age youngest child 4–11 yrs
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Fit formal childcare use
Figure A.5: Age youngest child 0–3 yrs
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Figure A.6: Age youngest child 4–11 yrs
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D Elasticities and shares with negative marginal utility by
number of latent classes
Table A.5: Elasticities by number of latent classes: youngest child 0–3 yrs
1 LC 2 LC 3 LC 4 LC
Gross hourly wage men +1%
Labour supply men 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.09
– Extensive margin 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.07
– Intensive margin 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Labour supply women –0.15 –0.15 –0.21 –0.15
Formal childcare 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.05
Gross hourly wage women +1%
Labour supply women 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.48
– Extensive margin 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.30
– Intensive margin 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.18
Labour supply men –0.04 –0.05 –0.07 –0.06
Formal childcare 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.45
Gross price formal childcare +1%
Formal Childcare –0.61 –0.66 –1.09 –0.92
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labour supply women –0.13 –0.14 –0.15 –0.16
Observed choices with negative marginal utility income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure men 0.74 0.39 0.00 0.08
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure women 0.38 0.36 0.09 0.00
Observed choices with negative marginal utility formal childcare 0.54 0.35 0.59 0.49
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Table A.6: Elasticities by number of latent classes: youngest child 4–11 yrs
1 LC 2 LC 3 LC 4 LC
Gross hourly wage men +1%
Labour supply men 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08
– Extensive margin 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.06
– Intensive margin 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Labour supply women –0.11 –0.07 –0.10 –0.11
Formal childcare 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.22
Gross hourly wage women +1%
Labour supply women 0.38 0.47 0.44 0.48
– Extensive margin 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.29
– Intensive margin 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.19
Labour supply men –0.03 –0.04 –0.07 –0.05
Formal childcare 0.45 0.77 0.71 0.83
Gross hourly price formal childcare +1%
Formal Childcare –0.36 –0.77 –0.70 –0.83
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labour supply women –0.02 –0.04 –0.04 –0.05
Observed choices with negative marginal utility income 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.08
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure men 0.78 0.17 0.26 0.41
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure women 0.41 0.22 0.34 0.02
Observed choices with negative marginal utility formal childcare 0.57 0.16 0.10 0.57
E Robustness check: including proxy for informal childcare
Table A.7: Elasticities for models w/o and w/ proxy informal childcare
Couples 0-3 yrs Couples 4-11 yrs
1 LC 2 LC 1 LC 2 LC
Model without proxy informal care
Labour supply elasticity men 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.06
Labour supply elasticity women 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.47
Price elasticity formal childcare –0.61 –0.66 -0.36 -0.77
Model with proxy informal care
Labour supply elasticity men 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06
Labour supply elasticity women 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.48
Price elasticity formal childcare –0.62 -0.70 -0.42 -0.84
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F Simulating the 2011-2013 childcare reform
With the empirical structural model we can also simulate the effects of recent cuts in
childcare subsidies. Following the steep rise in public expenditures on formal childcare over
the period 2005–2009, and after the Dutch economy was hit by the Great Recession, the
Dutch government announced to cut expenditures on childcare subsidies over the period
2011–2013. As a result, the average contribution rate of households to formal childcare
was projected to increase from 22% to 34% (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment,
2011). The redistributional effects on disposable household income are shown in Figure
A.7. The simulated effects on labor participation, formal childcare use and public finances
are given in Table A.8.
The reform is projected to have only a small negative effect on hours worked by fathers.
The effect is projected to be more pronounced for mothers, in particular for mothers with
a youngest child 0–3 years of age. Their hours worked drop by 3.4%, of which a substantial
part is on the intensive margin. The drop in the use of formal childcare is projected to be
much bigger in percentage terms, 14% respectively 20% for households with a youngest
child 0–3 years and 4–11 years of age. As a result, the knock-on effect for the government
budget is actually positive. Additional savings on childcare subsidies more than offset
the loss in tax receipts and the rise in benefit expenditures. We should also note that
the predicted decline in the use of formal childcare is actually quite similar to what is
observed following the recent cuts in childcare subsidies, with the use of formal childcare
falling by 18% (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014). However, uncertainty
about trend growth absent the reform, and the effect of the Great Recession, complicate
the comparison.
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Figure A.7: Redistributional effects childcare reform 2011–2013
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Table A.8: Simulation results: childcare reform 2011–2013
Youngest child 0–3 yrs Youngest child 4-11 yrs
Percentage changes Percentage changes
Labour supply men –0.15 –0.05
– Extensive margin –0.26 –0.02
– Intensive margin 0.11 –0.03
Labour supply women –3.43 –1.12
– Extensive margin –1.88 –0.45
– Intensive margin –1.58 –0.67
Formal childcare –14.24 –19.87
Overall effect
Percentage changes Millions of euro
Gini coefficient –1.05 Additional public exp. ex antea –154.4
Labour supply total –0.79 Knock–on effect childcare subsidies –109.2
Formal childcare total –15.53 Knock-on effect taxes and benefits 82.8
Additional public exp. ex posta –180.8
aAdditional public expenditures in our sample.
